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INTRODUCTION

Liu Lianren spent twelve years wandering the mountainous wilds
of Hokkaido, Japan's northernmost and coldest island. He ate weeds,
slept in caves, and assiduously avoided the Japanese.' A few weeks
before the end of World War II, Liu and several of his Chinese compatriots had fled the mine where they were forced to labor for the nowdefunct Meiji Mining Company. 2 Liu separated from his companions
and lived as a fugitive for over a decade. His isolation ended in February 1958, well after military hostilities between China and Japan had
ceased.3 A Japanese hunter happened upon the snowy concrete barrier into which Liu had burrowed, then surrendered the Chinese national to local police. 4 Unbeknownst to Liu, his Chinese citizenship
no longer made him an enemy ofJapan, but merely a very unwelcome
figure. Japan promptly deported him to China for overstaying his
visa. 5
As one of 38,935 men abducted from China, transported to Japan, and forced to engage in hard labor during World War 11,6 Liu's
plight foreshadowed a lifetime of delayed justice and bitter irony, for
him and other Chinese slave laborers. He returned to Japan in 1997
and successfully sued the state, though he passed away ten months
before the Tokyo District Court handed down the verdict. 7 While
Liu's story may appear improbable, it is not at all atypical of recent
slave-labor litigation in Japan.
In the past decade, dozens of former slave laborers from China
have gone to Japan to sue both the corporations that used their labor
during the war and the government that orchestrated their abduction." Chinese plaintiffs have filed fourteen lawsuits at the district
court level, 9 with decidedly mixed results.' 0 Of the eight decisions
already rendered, three have found for the plaintiffs, awarding them
I Liu Lianren v.Japan, 1067 HANREI TAIMUZU 119, 131 (Tokyo D. Ct.,July 12, 2001).
The Tokyo High Court reversed the district court's ruling on June 23, 2005. See Masami
Ito, Escaped Slave's Kin Lose Redress Award in Appeal JAPAN TIMES, June 24, 2005, at 2; Naki
Chichi, Nemurenai [My Deceased Father Cannot Rest]; ASAHI SHIMBUN, June 24, 2005, at 38.
2
MATSUO SHOICHI, IWANAMI PAMPHLET No. 466: CHUGOKUJIN SENSO HIGAISHA TO
SENGO BAISHO [CHINESE WAR VICTIMS AND POSTWAR REPARATIONS] 30 (1998).
" Id.
4

Id.

5

Id.

6

See Liu Lianren, 1067 HANREI TAIMUZU at 126.

7 See id. at 131.
8 See infra Part II.B.
9 Like the U.S. federal court system, the Japanese judiciary employs a three-tiered
system, consisting of fifty district courts, eight high courts (commensurate with the U.S.
circuit courts of appeals), and a supreme court. See Percy R. Luney, Jr., The Judiciary: Its
Organizationand Status in the ParliamentarySystem, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter & Spring
1990, at 135, 145-46.
10
See infra Part II.B.
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tens of thousands of dollars in damages; five have dismissed the suits
as time-barred or on grounds of state immunity, exculpating defendant corporations, the state, or both. Two other suits have arranged
for settlements.
At present, the Supreme Court of Japan is deliberating three
slave-labor cases, appealed from the Tokyo, Fukuoka, and Hiroshima
High Courts. 1 The Tokyo and Fukuoka High Courts found for the
defendants, while the Hiroshima High Court found for the plaintiffs.
These high courts actually reversed the decisions rendered by their
respective lower courts, underscoring pervasive uncertainty and inconsistency regarding the resolution of such claims. The supreme court's
decisions, expected to come down later this year, will influence lower
courts now wrestling with the slave-labor lawsuits, though it will not
bind them. 12 Although the supreme court has evinced little sympathy
for compensation claims arising out of World War 11,13 this disinclination should not shut the door to compensation. A different approach,
bearing the imprimatur of the Japanese Diet-Japan's parliament14
would be much more desirable.
This Note argues that the recent wave of litigation brought by
former Chinese slave laborers, while important in its own right, highlights the need for a more comprehensive solution. Although ideally
the Japanese Diet will devise its own response to the problem of compensation, the experiences arising from the Holocaust litigation in the
United States provide a meaningful yardstick for comparison. In the
United States, a large-scale settlement scheme followed, and finalized,
numerous lawsuits brought by former forced and slave laborers from
World War II Europe.' 5 The American response, though based on
different circumstances, led to a multibillion-dollar fund that has compensated over 1.5 million former forced and slave laborers. 16 A similar mass settlement for Chinese slave laborers would provide a
systematic and equitable distribution of funds to all aggrieved parties,
rather than to some lucky subset of litigants.
Part I of this Note investigates the history of World War II slave
labor in Japan, as well as the many provisions of international and
domestic law the practice violated. Part II surveys the factual back-

II

See infra Part II.B.
See Luney, supra note 9, at 159 ("Lower court judges have the discretion to render
decisions that differ from prior Supreme Court decisions on the same subject.").
13 See id. ("[L] ower court judges tend to be more liberal and more protective of fundamental human rights than Supreme Court justices."); see also TOp Court Nixes Sex Slave,
12

Korean Vet Suit,JAPAN TIMES, Nov. 30, 2004 (noting the Japanese Supreme Court's dismissal

in November 2004 of a thirteen-year-old suit by former Korean sex slaves).
14 See infra Part V.
15 See infra Part III.A.
16 See infta Part M.A.
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grounds and results of recent Japanese slave-labor lawsuits. Part III
shifts focus from Japan to the United States, where slave-labor litigation has yielded two methods of compensation. Finally, Part IV proposes mass settlement as a solution to the problems raised by slavelabor litigation.
I
SLAVE LABOR: IN PRACTICE AND THEORY

A.

Solving Japan's Wartime Labor Shortage

Japan took three years to plan the abduction of over 40,000 people from China. 17 On March 19, 1940, the Japanese Ministry of Commerce and Industry convened a meeting to discuss the possibility of
employing "coolies," or Chinese workers, to compensate for domestic
labor shortages. 18 Representatives from several corporations-including Mitsubishi Mining Enterprises, Mitsui Mining and Forestry, and
Hokkaido Coalmining and Shipping-also attended the meeting. 19
The proposal they drafted clearly envisioned a role for the Japanese
army in recruiting and transporting the laborers toJapan. 20 Thus, the
Japanese government, army, and private sector participated from the
very inception of the slave-labor campaign.
In November 1942, the Cabinet passed a resolution, Issues Concerning the Importation of Chinese Laborers, which envisioned a two-part
scheme to abduct laborers. 2 1 In the first "experimental" stage, the resolution provided that Chinese laborers would be brought to Japan to
compensate the severe labor shortage in heavy industry. 22 In the second "full-scale" stage, the government would examine the results of
the first stage and adjust the amount of "imported labor" accordingly. 23 The resolution also suggested the ideal physical characteris17

The Japanese army, at times with the help of Chinese accessories, brought 41,762

Chinese, primarily men, to concentration camps set up on the Chinese mainland. NIHON
BENGOSHI

RENGOKAI [JAPAN LAWYERS' ASS'N], NIHON NO SENGO HOSHO [JAPAN'S POSTWAR

REPARATIONS] 75 (1994) [hereinafter NICHIBENKAI]. Over 2,800 Chinese either fled or died

in the camps, leaving some 38,935 to board the ships to Japan. Id.
18

NISHINARITA YUTAKA, CHUGOKUJIN KYoSEI RENKO [CHINESE FORCED MOBILIZATION]

19-20 (2002). The use of the term "coolie" for Chinese laborer, and "Shina" for China,
was part of a larger discursive strategy to dehumanize the Chinese. See STEFAN TANAKA,
JAPAN'S ORIENT: RENDERING PASTS INTO HISTORY 3-6 (1993) (noting thatJapanese scholars
and officials used terms such as "Shina" to suggestJapan's preeminence, and China's backwardness, in the early twentieth century).
19
NISHINARITA, supra note 18, at 19.
20
Id. at 20.
21 Cai Shujing v. Mitsui Mining Co., 1098 HANREI TAIMUZU 267, 273 (Fukuoka D. Ct.,
Apr. 26, 2002), rev'd, 1875 HANREI JIHO 62 (Fukuoka High Ct., May 24, 2004).
22

Id.

23

Id.
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tics of the laborers, 24 what they should eat, 25 and, in another ironic
26
twist, how much they would be paid.
From April to November 1943, the government entered into the
first phase of the forced mobilization scheme, bringing 1,411 Chinese
laborers 27 into Japanese coal mines, factories, and stevedoring operations. 28 After positively appraising the success of the first phase, the
government summoned in the second phase by passing the resolution
entitled "Issues Concerning the Acceleration of the Importation of
Chinese Laborers" on February 28, 1944.29 From March 1944 to May
1945, the Japanese redoubled their efforts, abducting over 37,000 ad30
ditional Chinese laborers.
Once captured, the Chinese were brought to concentration
31
camps set up in China and subsequently sent in cargo ships toJapan.
From there, they were dispatched to one of 135 worksites throughout
the archipelago. 3 2 According to a report drawn up after the war by
the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 3 3 Chinese laborers engaged in four basic types of labor:
1) 16,368 mined (extracting coal, copper, mercury, and iron; refining ores).
2) 15,253 worked on civil engineering projects (constructing power
plants, airfields, and factories; removing snow from railroads).
3) 6,099 worked as stevedores.
34
4) 1,215 built ships.
Issues Concerning the Importation of Chinese Laborers (ICICL) § 2.4 states: " ' I mported Chinese laborers should be men under the age of 40, screened for good health,
and not be accompanied by their families."' See Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Co. & Japan, 50
SHOMU GEPPCO 3444, 3456 (Niigata D. Ct., Mar. 26, 2004).
25
ICICL § 2.9 states, "'Chinese laborers will not eat rice, but will be given what Chinese laborers normally eat; special measures for food rations will be devised in Japan."' Id.
26
ICICL § 2.10 states, "'The salary of the laborers will be commensurate with wages
they would make in China [Shina]; they will be allowed to remit money back to their families.'" Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 3461.
29
Liu Lianren v. Japan, 1067 HANREI TAIMUZU 124 (Tokyo D. Ct., July 12, 2001).
30
Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Co. & Japan, 50 SHOMU GEPPO 3444, 3462 (Niigata D. Ct.,
Mar. 26, 2004).
31
Though the Chinese labored throughout Japan, over half (19,631) were sent to
Hokkaido, Japan's coldest and harshest island. Id. at 3467.
32
Id.
33
Throughout the slave-labor litigation, the Japanese government has denied the
existence of this detailed and controversial report. See William Underwood, Chinese Forced
Labor, the Japanese Government and the Prospectsfor Redress, JAPAN Focus, July 8, 2005, http://
japanfocus.org/article.asp?id=326. The report contains elaborate information about, inter
alia, the treatment, living conditions, and causes of death of the slave laborers. See Minami
Norio, Zenmen Kaiketsu e Sh6nenba Mukaeru: Kyosei Renki Hoshi Mondai [ The Forced Mobilization Compensation Problem: Heading Toward a Comprehensive Solution], 508 SHOKAN KIN'Y6B
46, 46 (2004).
34 Rinko, 50 SHOMU GEPPO at 3466.
24
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Working conditions varied from site to site, but anecdotal evi36
35
dence suggests that twelve-hour days were common, meals meager,
37
and abuse from Japanese employers rampant.
B.

Slave Labor as a Violation of International Law

Slave labor violates numerous provisions of international, Japanese, and Chinese law. Because Chinese plaintiffs have brought
claims based on all three legal regimes, an examination of the relevant international and domestic law is in order. This subpart first examines violations of international treaties and customary international
law, then focuses on specific articles of the Chinese and Japanese civil
codes.
1. International Treaty Law
The International Court of Justice, the judicial organ of the
United Nations, lists several sources of international law, chief among
them "international conventions, whether general or particular."3 8
This section will show that Japan's abduction of forced laborers violated two international treaties to which it was a signatory: the Hague
Convention and the Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory
Labor.
The Hague Convention provides, in pertinent part, that an occupying military force must respect "the lives of persons" in the occupied territory.3 9 Japan ratified the Hague Convention on December
13, 1911,40 signaling its commitment to upholding this provision. By

1942, the Japanese military had penetrated vast swaths of central and
northeastern China, 4' triggering Japan's obligation under the Hague
Convention to respect the lives of Chinese in that area. However, by
35
The MFA Report put the number at nine to ten hours. Id. at 3468. However, the
laborers themselves estimated that the figure was closer to twelve hours. See MATSUO, supra
note 2, at 29-30 (noting that Liu Lianren, working in Hokkaido, and Li Wanzhong, working in Gunma prefecture, labored twelve hours per day).
36
Sakaguchi Yoshihiko, Chugokujin senso baisho seikyii sosho no doko [Winning Trends
Among Chinese War Reparations Claims], ROD6 HORITSU JUNPO, Feb. 25, 1997, at 45. Similarly, Liu Lianren "was given only one mantou, made of a fistful of flour, per day." MATsuo, supra note 2, at 29.
37
See MATSUO, supra note 2, at 29; Sakaguchi, supra note 36, at 45.
38 Statute of the Court of International Justice art. 38(1) (a), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 3 Bevans 1153; see also MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 11
(3d ed. 1999) ("[M]ost observers assign legal rules drawn from international agreements
the highest rank among all the sources of international law.").
39
Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 46,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631.
40
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, at 131 (James Brown Scott ed., 2d ed. 1915).
SeeJOHN KING FAIRBANK, CHINA: A NEW HISTORY 315 map 23 (1992) (featuring a
41
map of Japan's penetration into northern China through 1942).
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abducting individuals from the occupied area, forcibly transporting
them to Japan, and reducing them to forced laborers, the Japanese
42
government violated the integrity of the tens of thousands of lives.
The Hague Convention was further violated when nearly 7,000 Chinese lost their lives to malnourishment, beatings, and other acts of
43
violence at the hands of the Japanese.
Moreover, Japan's forced labor campaign violated the Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor. 44 Article 1 requires
signatories to "suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all
its forms within the shortest possible period. '45 One might argue that
the language "the shortest possible period" would allow Japan some
time to comply with the treaty, but Japan ratified the Forced Labor
Convention in November 1932,46 a decade before the first abductions.
Thus, the decision in 1942 to engage in forced labor, which came
from the highest echelon of government, 47 demonstrated Japan's willingness to violate a binding international treaty.
Despite clear violations of two international treaties, Japanese
courts have refused to compensate plaintiffs in claims based on these
violations. 48 While scholars believe that international treaties should
have direct effect in such claims againstJapan, 49 few judges agree. As
Judge Katano Nobuyoshi stated in Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Co., "[T]he
[Hague] Convention does not provide that warring states owe a duty
of compensation directly to individuals; rather, as is the general principle of international law, the convention can only be interpreted as
42
Plaintiffs made a similar argument in Rinko, but the Niigata District Court held that
the Hague Convention did not give individuals standing to sue the government. See Zhang
Wenbin v. Rinko Co. &Japan, 50 SH6MU GEPPO 3444, 3616 (Niigata D. Ct., Mar. 26, 2004).
The court claimed that Chinese laborers served, on average, 13.3 months of labor; some
worked for well over two years, while others worked only for five weeks. See id. at 3467.
43
Okochi Minori, Chfigokujin Kytsei Renk6, Kyosei Rtdo Sosh6 Hanketsu [Chinese Forced
Mobilization and Forced Labor], 597 HOGAKu SEMINA [LAw SEMINAR] 20, 20 (2004).
44
Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor (ILO No. 29),June 28, 1930,
39 U.N.T.S. 56 [hereinafter Forced Labor Convention]. Article 2(1) defines forced or
compulsory labor as "all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily." Id.
art. 2(1). Forced laborers frequently faced the threat of death, starvation, or abuse, either
at the concentration camps or in their workplaces. ZHONGCUtO LAOGONG ZAI RIBEN [CHI
NESE LABOR IN JAPAN] 20 (He Tianyi ed., 1995). Moreover, scholars estimate that 95% of
Chinese laborers were forcibly detained, while the rest "volunteered" based on misinformation. Id. at 17.
45
Forced Labor Convention, supra note 44, art. 1(1).
46
NICHIBENKAI, supra note 17, at 289.
47
See supra notes 17-26 and accompanying text.
48
See, e.g., Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Co. &Japan, 50 SH6MU GEPPO 3444, 3617 (Niigata
D. Ct., Mar, 26, 2004) (rejecting plaintiffs' arguments for compensation based on Japan's
violation of the Hague Convention).
49

See Yuji IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND JAPANESE LAw: THE IM-

PACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON JAPANESE LAw

domestic legal force in Japan.").

29 (1998) ("[International] treaties have
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establishing obligations between states." 50 In other words, according
to Japanese judges, international treaties do not provide a cause of
action to a person who has suffered due to a treaty violation. Consequently, successful slave-labor plaintiffs have had to turn to other legal
regimes to vindicate themselves. 5 1
2.

Customary InternationalLaw

Japan undoubtedly imposed numerous affirmative obligations on
itself by signing treaties, but it may also have been bound by treaties it
did not sign. A nonsignatory state may be bound if, for example, a
treaty's provisions have attained the status of customary international
law (CIL). 5 2 In theory, Japan follows the formulation endorsed by
most countries: The general practice of states coupled with opiniojuris,
or a sense of legal obligation, creates

CIL. 53

In practice, however, the

government rarely speaks openly about whether its actions follow
from opinio juris.54 Instead, scholars look to widespread acceptance

from various countries to decide whether a norm has attained the status of CIL. 55 A brief examination of international treaties from the

early twentieth century, such as the League of Nations Mandate 5 6 and
the Slavery Convention, 57 reveals that CIL firmly prohibited the use of
58
forced or slave labor by the 1940s.

Numerous treaties helped to erode the credibility of forced labor
in the nineteenth century 59 such that, by the early twentieth century,
Rinko, 50

SHOMU GEPPO at 3617.
See infra Part I.C.
JANIS, supra note 38, at 22-23.
53
IwASAwA, supra note 49, at 35.
54
SeeJANIS, supra note 38, at 47 ("[E]xamples of formal state expressions of opinio
juris ... are rare . . . and indeed far from prevalent in practice generally.").
55
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 102, cmt. b (1987) ("[A
customary law practice] should reflect wide acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity. Failure of a significant number of important states to adopt a
practice can prevent a principle from becoming general customary law. .. ").
56
Japan was one of the original forty-two members of the League of Nations, formed
on January 10, 1920. See F.P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 65, 495
(1969). Though it later withdrew from the League in March 1933, many of the provisions
contained in the League's mandate had achieved status as CIL and would bind Japan regardless of its withdrawal. See id. at 495.
57
See generally Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46
Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 (outlining an international ban on the slave trade). Japan did
not accede to this convention, yet slavery was a clear violation of CIL at this time. See infra
notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
58
See NICHIBENKAI, supra note 17, at 287-88.
59
See, e.g., Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, supra note 57, pmbl.
(noting that the General Act of the Brussells Conference of 1889-90 "declared that they
were... animated by the firm intention of putting an end to the traffic in African slaves");
Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain for the Suppression of the Slave Trade,
U.S.-U.K., Apr. 7, 1862, 12 Star. 1225.
50
51
52
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the prohibition of forced labor had reached the status of CIL. 6° Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, for example, provides that
each signatory must guarantee the "prohibition of abuses such as the
slave trade" in its colonies. 6 1 Signatories should also "secure and
maintain fair and humane conditions of labour... both in their own
countries and in all countries to which their commercial and industrial relations extend." 62 While one document alone cannot create
CIL, in 1919 the Covenant nonetheless took an important first step
toward universalizing the condemnation of forced labor.
In 1926, the League of Nations followed up with the supplementary Slavery Convention. 63 In this agreement, every high contracting
state agreed both to "prevent and suppress the slave trade" 64 and "to
take all necessary measures to prevent compulsory or forced labour
from developing into conditions analogous to slavery." 6 5 Thus, the
agreement placed affirmative obligations on signatories to eradicate
slavery, or any similar conditions. Postwar treaties banning slavery,
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 66 also indicate
that slave labor violated contemporary norms and customary interna67
tional law.

As noted above, Japan was not a party to several significant treaties. Though an original member of the League of Nations, Japan
withdrew its membership in March 1933.68 Japan also declined to sign
the Slavery Convention. 69 Nevertheless, by the 1940s, global condemnation of slave labor signified that the practice violated CIL, a position
adopted by U.S. district courts. 70 As with international treaty viola60
The Vienna Convention defines jus cogens (compelling law) as "a norm accepted
and recognized by the international community as a norm ... from which no derogation is
permitted." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969,1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
61
League of Nations Covenant art. 22, para. 5. Fifty-two nations counted among its
original members, signifying the widespread acceptance of the ideals enshrined therein.
See WALTERS, supra note 56, at 64-66.
62
League of Nations Covenant art. 23(a).
63
The convention was signed by thirty-seven nations. See Convention to Suppress the

Slave Trade and Slavery, supra note 57.
64
Id. art. 2(a).
65
Id. art. 5.
66
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 4, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) ("No one shall be held in slavery
or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.").
67
See NICHIBENKA], supra note 17, at 288 (noting that by 1938, the prohibition of slavery was a confirmed part of CIL).
68

See W.G.

BEASLEY, JAPANESE IMPERIALISM

1894-1945, at 200 (1987).

69 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Slavery Convention Participants, http://
www.unhchr.html/menu3/b/treaty3.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
70
See Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 440 (D.N.J. 1999) ("The use of
unpaid, forced labor during World War II violated clearly established norms of customary
international law.").
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tions, however, issues of standing have prevented plaintiffs from successfully pursuing CIL claims. 71 As discussed in greater detail below,
the handful of Japanese courts that have found defendants liable ulti72
mately relied upon the domestic legal regime to attach liability.

C.

Slave Labor as a Violation of Japanese and Chinese
Domestic Law

Quite apart from its repugnance to international law and legal
norms, the Japanese slave-labor campaign also violated various provisions of Chinese and Japanese domestic law. As civil law countries,
both Japan7 3 and China 7 4 have amalgamated much of their law into
civil codes, phrasing law in general terms for wide applicability. The
broad provisions of both systems not only prohibit slave labor, but also
allow for individual damages.
1. Japanese Law
In the slave-labor lawsuits, the most commonly cited violations of
the Japanese Civil Code involve Articles 415, 709, and 715. The most
straightforward of these, Article 709, states that "[a] person who violates intentionally or negligently the right of another is bound to
make compensation for damages arising therefrom." 75 While this provision may appear hopelessly vague, its applicability to the slave-labor
cases is relatively transparent: Virtually any of the state's acts (abduction, forced transportation, enslavement) or the defendant corporations' acts (enslavement, abuse, failure to provide humane
conditions) would qualify as an infringement on the rights of the laborers. Given the wide latitude that Article 709 affords, courts have
76
repeatedly found defendants liable based on this provision.
A less obvious claim stems from Article 415 of the Civil Code: "If
an obligor fails to effect performance in accordance with the tenor
and purport of the obligation, the obligee may claim damages." 77 In
the employment context, this Article is often interpreted to impose
upon the employer (obligor) a "duty to ensure the safety" of its em71
See, e.g.,
Liu Zonggen v. Nippon Yakin Kogy6 Co. &Japan, 1822 HANEiJIHO 83,96
(Kyoto D. Ct., Jan. 15, 2003).
72 See infra Part II.B.2.
73 The Meiji government instituted the Minp, or Civil Code of Japan, still in force
today, in 1899. See COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 15 (Kenneth
L. Port & Gerald Paul McAlinn eds., 2003).
74 Though it has since changed, the Chinese Civil Code of 1930 was in effect at the
time of the crimes discussed here.
75

MINPO, art. 709.

76 See, e.g., Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Co. &Japan, 50 SHOMU GEPPO 3444, 3578 (Niigata
D. Ct., Mar. 26, 2004); Cai Shujing v. Mitsui Mining Co., 1098 HANREI TAIMUZU 267 (Fukuoka D. Ct., Apr. 26, 2002), rev'd, 1875 HANREi JIHo 62 (Fukuoka High Ct., May 24, 2004).
77
MINPO, art. 415.
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ployees (obligees).78 In the context of slave-labor litigation, courts
frequently entertain the legal fiction that relations between Japanese
companies and Chinese slave laborers were contractual, or equivalent
to an employer-employee relationship. 79 Although at least two key
facts belie this understanding of slave-labor relations,8 0 the 2004 Rinko
decision, building on earlier cases,8 1 extrapolated from Article 415's
provision to find that both the state and the defendant corporation
8 2
owed a "duty to ensure the safety" of the slave laborers.
Finally, claims based on Article 715, the Civil Code's equivalent of
respondeat superior,have also been successfully pursued against the defendants. This Article provides, "A person who employs another to
carry out an undertaking is bound to make compensation for damage
done to a third person by the employee in the course of the execution
of the undertaking."8 3 In applying this principle, Japanese courts
have broadly construed the provision to protect those directly harmed
by the defendants' actions. The Rinko decision, for instance, found
the state liable under Article 715.84
2.

Chinese Law

In certain circumstances, Japanese courts permit the application
of foreign law. Foreign-law claims are adjudicated under the Japanese
H6rei, or Act on the Application of Laws, which provides, "The formation and effect of claims arising from agency by necessity (negotiorum
gestio), unjust enrichment, and tort shall be governed by the law of
the place where the events causing the claims occurred."8 5 Slave laSee, e.g., infra Part II.B.2(c).
See ZHONGGUO LAOGONG ZAI RIBEN, supra note 44, at 19-20.
80 First, any such contract would have been invalid. Most Chinese laborers were abducted and forced to work against their will, without any mention of a contract. Id. In a
small minority of cases, Japanese quasi-governmental recruiters did offer contracts to Chinese laborers, which included terms for wages, provisions, transportation to Japan, and so
on. Id. Given the subsequent treatment of the laborers, these contracts were manifestly
broken. Scholars also suggest that these contracts were invalid because the laborers either
did not sign the contracts or did not understand the contract's provisions. See id.
Second, both "employment" and its Japanese counterpart, koyo, suggest that the
worker will receive compensation for his work. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 459
(2d college ed. 1986) (defining "employ" as "to engage the services of labor of for pay");
KOJIEN (defining "koy" as "an arrangement where one party (the employee) agrees to perform some service, and the other party (employer) agrees to give compensation").
81
See, e.g., Shao Yicheng v. Nishimatsu Constr., 1110 HANREI TAIMUZu 253 (Hiroshima
D. Ct., July 9, 2002), rev'd, 1865 HANREI JINO 62 (Hiroshima High Ct.,July 9, 2004); Geng
Zhun v. Kajima Co., 990 HANREI TAIMUZU 250 (Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 12, 1997).
82
See Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Co. & Japan, 50 SHOMU GEPPO 3444, 3579 (Niigata D.
Ct., Mar. 26, 2004) (noting that defendant state and corporation were jointly obliged to
compensate plaintiffs).
83 MINPO, art. 715.
84 Rinko, 50 SHOMU GEPPO at 3580.
85
HOREi, art. 11, para. 1, translated in Kent Anderson & Yasuhiro Okuda, Translation:
Horei, Act on the Application of Laws, 3 ASLAN-PAC. L. & PoL'vJ. 230, 235-36 (2002).
78
79
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borers have availed themselves of this provision in advancing two
86
claims based on the Chinese Civil Code.
First, Article 184 of the Chinese Civil Code provides, "A person
who, intentionally or by his own fault, wrongfully injures the rights of
another is bound to compensate him for any damage arising therefrom. ' 87 Thus, the abductions, forcible transports to Chinese concentration camps, substandard living conditions in those camps, and
other activities that took place on Chinese soil could expose Japan to
liability. 88 It is not surprising that Chinese plaintiffs frequently invoke
89
this Article in their lawsuits.

Second, Article 195 protects people's bodily integrity and liberty
interests by providing that "[i]n the case of injury to the body,
health ... or liberty of another, the injured party may claim a reasonable compensation in money for such damage as is not a purely pecuni-

ary loss."90 Chinese laborers, who suffered injury to body, health, and
liberty, would have a strong case against the Japanese government for
the same unlawful acts outlined above. Nevertheless, Japanese courts
have refused claims based on extraterritorial theories. 9 1 Even the
Rinko decision, the most sympathetic to slave laborers so far, refused
to apply foreign law (i.e., the Chinese Civil Code) to an act of the
Japanese government. Instead, reasoning that slave labor was both a
government act and part of government policy, the court concluded
that Japanese rather than Chinese law had a closer relationship to the
slave-labor claims-even claims relating to the acts that occurred on
Chinese soil.92 Thus, slave-labor claims would not be adjudicated

93
under Chinese law via Article 11 of the H6rei.
Despite the wide array of legal provisions and theories upon
which plaintiffs have based their claims, Japanese courts have thus far
only recognized violations of the Japanese Civil Code. 94 As the next
Part discusses, even when Japanese courts made the groundbreaking
choice to find for plaintiffs in these lawsuits, they did so within a domestic legal framework. 95 A more detailed look at slave-labor litiga-

86

See, e.g.,Rinko, 50 SHOMU GEPPO at 3620; Chinese Plaintiffs v. Japan, 50 SHoMU

GEPPO 439 (Tokyo D. Ct., Mar. 11, 2003).
87 MINFA [Civil Code], art. 184 (P.R.C. 1930).
88 The government and military of Japan were responsible for rounding up labor on
Chinese soil; the corporations, however, used the labor on only Japanese soil and thus are
not likely liable under Chinese law.
89

See, e.g.,Rinko, 50 SHOMU GEPPO at 3620; Liu Lianren v. Japan,

TAIMUZU 119, 141 (Tokyo D. Ct., July 7, 2000).
90
MINFA, art. 195.
91

See, e.g., Rinko, 50 SHOMU GEPPO at 3621.

92

See id. at 3621.

93

Id.

94
95

See infra Part II.B.2.
See infra Part II.B.2,
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tion reveals that Japanese courts rarely accept claims based on
violations of international treaty or other nondomestic law, even
though scholarly writings urge otherwise. 96
II
SLAVE-LABOR LITIGATION IN JAPAN

A.

Recent Reevaluation of World War II

The slave-labor litigation in Japan has helped raise awareness of
this dark episode in Japanese history. Yet why, five decades after the
war, did Chinese plaintiffs finally seek justice in Japanese district
courts? A wide range of factors contributed to this trend, several of
which are addressed here. First, the Chinese government alleviated
bans on foreign travel for its own citizens in 1986. 9 7 Insignificant

though the lifting of this restriction may seem, it has had important
consequences for the frequently fatal statute-of-limitations defense.
Some courts have decided to toll the statute of limitations, starting the
clock in 1986, when Chinese citizens were first allowed to go to Japan
to file claims, rather than in 1944 or 1945, when the events actually
took place. 9 8
Second, discontent among other East Asian countries vis-d-visJapan's reluctance to acknowledge responsibility for World War II has
festered for decades, stoked by the ongoing "textbook controversies" 99
and official visits to Yasukuni Shrine.10 0 Disgruntlement peaked in
1991, after the Japanese government denied the existence of "comfort
women"-or military sexual slaves 0 1-who then decided to file a law96 See infta Part II.
97 See Yamada Katsuhiko, SaibanJitsumukara Mita Sengo Baish6 [PostwarReparations as
Seen from Tial Results], in KYODO KENKVO: CHUGOKU SENGO BAISHO-REKISHI, Ho, SAIBAN
[JOINT RESEARCH ON CHINESE PosTwAR REPARATIONS: HISTORY, LAW, COURTS] 217, 229
(Kawashima Shin et al. eds., 2000).
98 Id. at 229-30.
99 The depiction of various Japanese military actions during World War II in Professor
lenaga Saburo's textbook ofJapanese history has displeased officials in the Japanese Ministry of Education since at least 1965, when lenaga first filed suit for violations of his constitutional right to expression. A 1984 decision by the Tokyo High Court fueled continental
animosity toward Japan when the court ordered lenaga to delete phrases such as 'Japanese
military atrocities" and "Korean resistance" from his texts. See generally COMPARATIVE LAw,
supra note 73, at 262 (describing the background to the lenaga case and providing a translation of the supreme court's decision).
100 Official visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates and houses the remains of
numerous Japanese war criminals, have provoked criticisms from neighboring countries

since the 1980s.

See YoSHIKUNI IGARASHI, BODIES OF MEMORY. NARRATIVES OF WAR IN POST-

WARJAPANESE CULTURE,

1945-1970, at 203-04 (2000). Prime Minister KoizumiJunichiro's

visit on October 17, 2005, for instance, incited protests from South Korea and China and

led the latter to cancel talks between Chinese and Japanese foreign ministers. See Reiji
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005, at 1.
GENDER ix (Beverly Yamamoto trans., 2004).

Yoshida, Koizumi Visits Yasukuni Shrine,JAPAN
101 See CHIZUKO UENO, NATIONALISM AND

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:733

suit of their own.' 0 2 By 1995, Korean, Taiwanese, and Chinese plaintiffs filed over twenty lawsuits in Japanese district courts, seeking
compensation for Japan's wartime atrocities.1 03 More recently, in
March and April 2005, tens of thousands of Chinese protesters took to
the streets of Beijing, Shanghai, and other Chinese cities, shouting
anti-Japanese slogans, vandalizing Japanese establishments, and demanding apologies for Japan's conduct during World War 11.104 The
conspicuous silence of the Japanese Diet no longer seemed a tenable
response.105
However averse the Japanese government has been to acknowledging responsibility for the war, many Japanese lawyers and scholars
have helped uncoverJapan's role in World War II. Crucial to the Chi-

nese slave-labor lawsuits was a corps of Japanese lawyers who actually
sought out and interviewed former laborers in China.1 0 6 As one
scholar stated, "Nearly all of the cases were brought by Japanese lawyers (bengoshi) who sought out and made contacts with foreign war
victims.' 0 7 Many of these lawyers have created websites about the liti102 In April 1991, the Japanese Embassy flatly denied the request of a group of Korean
comfort women that Japan produce evidence and acknowledge the truth of the forced
conscription of the women; spurred by the Japanese government's denial of responsibility,
nine comfort women filed suit in Tokyo District Court on December 6, 1991. George
Hicks, The "Comfort Women," in THE JAPANESE WARTIME EMPIRE, 1931-1945, at 305, 307-08
(Peter Duus et al. eds., 1996).
103
See Aitani Kunio, Sengo Hoshd Saiban no Genjo to Kadai [Current Status and Issues on
Postwar Compensation Lawsuits], 10 KIKAN SENSO SEKININ KENKYfj 2, 3 (1995) (displaying a
chart of twenty-two lawsuits brought by victims of Japanese wartime behavior). As of May
2004, experts put the number of such lawsuits at seventy-two. See Minami, supra note 33, at
46.
104
Whether or not these protests represent an outpouring of popular Chinese sentiment, they at least reflect a widespread belief among contemporary Chinese thatJapan still
owes a sizable debt from World War II. See Jim Yardley, Chinese Police Head Off Anti-Japan
Protests, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2005, at A12.
105 The Diet has yet to respond to the challenges posed by slave laborers, though recent victories may force the Diet to break its silence. In response to the comfort women's
demands, by contrast, the Diet set up the Asian Women's Fund, which funnels private
donations from Japanese people to former comfort women under the auspices of the government. See UENO, supra note 101, at 179-82. Significantly, however, the government
contributes nothing to the fund, merely acting as a conduit for funds raised from private
citizens. Id. at 182. Many former comfort women have objected to the emptiness of this
gesture and have refused to accept financial assistance from the fund. Id. at 182.
106 Japanese lawyers and scholars have organized research groups (chosadan) and lawyers groups (bengodan) to plan strategies, meet with plaintiffs, and conduct research. For
instance, the Chinese War Victims Legal Research Group made four fact-finding visits to
China in 1994. See Yamada, supra note 97, at 229-30.
107
He Ming, Trialfor PersonalLegal CompensationAfter World War I: The Issues and Significance, 15 BUNKYO DAIGAKu KOKuSAi GAKUBU Krao 97, 101 (2004), available at http://
www.bunkyo.ac.jp/faculty/lib/slib/kiyo/Int/itl501/itl5OlO6.pdf. A plaintiff in the Niigata District Court case, Wang Chengwei, congenially confirmed the collaboration ofJapanese lawyers: "At the time [the suit was filed], a fewJapanese friends-Japanese lawyerscame to our village." Shendu Baogao: Zhongguo Laogong Riben Suopei'an Shengsu [In-depth
Report: Chinese Laborers Win Compensation Suit in Japan], Mar. 30, 2004, http://
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gation, initiated petition campaigns, and written articles documenting
the successes and failures of this movement.108
Numerous groups supporting compensation have also emerged,
circulating petitions, gathering signatures, and disseminating information through the web.' 0 9 It may be difficult to quantify the effects of
these groups' efforts: Only judges will know for sure if a petition with
104,000 signatures presented to the Fukuoka District Court was "the
key to victory," as one member of the Group Supporting the Fukuoka
Trial on Chinese Forced Labor asserted.' 10 Nevertheless, the efforts
of these groups have both heightened awareness of slave labor and
highlighted recent attempts to obtain compensation.
B.

Litigating Slave-Labor Claims in Japan

Since 1995, former Chinese slave laborers have filed fifteen suits
in Japanese district courts.1 1 Two of these suits have been settled, six
have been decided (and subsequently appealed), and seven are pending. 112 Among the six decisions handed down, a clear split emerges:
three courts have found for plaintiffs, and three courts have found for
defendants." 3 The Supreme Court of Japan is currently hearing appeals from three different high courts, and its decisions will provide
news.xinhuanet.com/newscen ter/2004-03/30/content1 391462.htm (last visited Nov. 25,
2004).
See, e.g., Chugokujin Sens6 Higaisha no Y6kyni wo Sasaeru Kai [Support Group for
108
the Demands of Chinese War Victims], http://www.suopei.org/indexj.html; Sengo
Sekinin [War Responsibility], http://www.sengo-sekinin.com. Both websites list articles,
comments, news, and upcoming events relating to the slave-labor issue in particular and
war responsibility more generally.
109 See, e.g., Asian Holocaust, http://www.skycitygallery.com/japan/japan.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2006).
110 See Maeumi Mitsuhiro, Chf2gokujin Ky6sei Renk6, Kyosei Rodo fiken Fukuoka Saiban
kara, Ayamachi wo Mitome, Tsugunai, tomo no Ayamu Ajia no Rekishi wo! [From the Fukuoka Trial
on Chinese Forced Labor and Mobilization, Walking Toward an Asian History that Admits Mistakes
and Compensates.'], 624 SHINPO TO KAAKU [PROGRESS AND REFORM] 39, 42 (2003).
111 See Chinese Laborers Demand Apology, Compensation, PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Aug. 12,
(listing
2004, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200408/12/eng20040812152695.html
thirteen lawsuits). Since that time, Chinese laborers have initiated at least two other lawsuits in Japan-one in Yamagata District Court, the other in Kanazawa District Court. See
Chugokujin Kydsei Renk6 de Teiso: Baisho Motome Yonin, Kanazawa Chisai [Four Chinese Forced
Laborers Sue, Seeking Compensation in Kanazawa District Court], YAHOO! NEWS JAPAN, July 19,
2005, http://headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20050719-00000079-kyodo-soci (noting that four
Chinese plaintiffs filed suit againstJapan and the Nanao Land & Sea Transport Company,
seeking forty-four million yen and an apology); Saketa ni Kyjsei Renko: Chutgokujin Rokunin,
Teiso e Kuni to Kigyd Aite tori [Forced Labor in Saketa: Six Chinese Bring Suit Against State and
Company], MAINICHI SHIMBUN, Nov. 26, 2004, available at http://www.mainichi-msn.co.jp/
shakai/jiken/news/20041111 kOOOOmO4Ol63000c.html (noting that six former Chinese
forced laborers filed a suit against Japan and the Saketa Land & Sea Transport Company,
seeking twenty million yen and an apology).
112
See infra Part 1I.B.1-3.
113
See infra Part lI.B.2-3.
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important guidance to lower courts faced with slave-labor disputes. 114
The following sections present the suits in roughly chronological
order.
1. Settlements: Hanaoka and Beyond
Though former Korean forced laborers first brought World War
II compensation claims in the early 1990s, 1 1 5 the first Chinese forced
laborers did not file suit until 1995.116 At that point, eleven Chinese
former slave laborers sought compensation from the Kajima Construction Corporation, which ran a copper mine during the war.1 1 7 After
five years of unsuccessful negotiations with Kajima, 118 the former laborers sued in Tokyo District Court, 119 where, before testimony had
even begun, 120 the trial court dismissed the action based on the Japanese Civil Code's twenty-year statute of limitations. 12 1 On appeal in
April 2000, the Tokyo High Court suggested a compromise settlement, whereby Kajima would pay approximately $4.3 million to the
families of the 986 slave laborers in the form of a Hanaoka Fund for
Peace Friendship. 122 After seven more months of negotiating, the
company finally agreed to establish the fund.1 23 Thus, the first suit
114 As Japan is a civil-law society, its courts do not follow the doctrine of stare decisis.
Similarly, lower courts are not bound to follow the decisions of the Japanese Supreme
Court, though they tend to do so. Luney, supra note 9, at 159.
115
See, e.g., Kim Ky6ng-sok v. NKK Co., 1614 HANREI JIHO 41 (Tokyo D. Ct., Sep. 25,
1997); Kim Sun-gil v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Co., 1641 HANREIJIH6 124 (Nagasaki D. Ct.,
Dec. 2, 1997). Kim Ky6 ng-sok's case settled eight years later, when Kim received over four
million yen from the steel-making company. See NKK to Compensate Korean Forced Laborerfor
Assault, KvoDo NEws INT'L, Apr. 12, 1999, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOWDQ/is_1999_April_l 2/ai_54388547.
116
Geng Zhun v. Kajima Co., 988 HANREI TAIMUZU 250 (Tokyo D. Ct., Dec. 12, 1997).
117
See id.
118 See Niimi Tadashi, HanaokaJiken Saiban ni tsuite [ On the Trial of the Hanaoka Incident], 20 KIKAN SENSO SEKININ KENKYII 2, 7 (1998) ("In the 'Joint Declaration' issued by the
Chinese victims and Kajima Construction Company onJuly 5, 1990, Kajima not only recognized the historical facts of forced mobilization and labor, but also apologized, and acknowledged its own corporate responsibility. [However,] Kajima afterward divided
responsibility into legal responsibility and moral responsibility; it denied the former, and
only went so far as to admit to the latter.").
119 Joji Sakurai, JapaneseFirm Will Pay Chinese for Brutality: Settlement Could Open Way for
Other WWII Cases, SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 30, 2000, at A16.

120

Uchida Masatoshi, The Hanaoka Incident: Corporate Compensation for Forced Labor,JA-

May 2, 2001, http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/hanaoka01.html.
121
Article 724 of the Civil Code of Japan provides, "A right to claim compensation for
the damage which has arisen from an unlawful act shall lapse . . .if twenty years have
elapsed from the time the unlawful act was committed." MINPO, art. 724.
122
See Uchida, supra note 120.
123
Id. (noting that the court announced both parties' agreement on November 29,
2000).
PAN IN THE WORLD,
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brought by Chinese slave laborers was also the first case to be resolved
124
through settlement.
Based on this brief synopsis, settlement might seem a likely conclusion to most slave-labor cases. Yet, two unique factors likely pressed
the Tokyo High Court into devising a settlement in the case against
Kajima. First, an event that transpired during the war, known as the
Hanaoka Incident, lent urgency to the plaintiffs' case.1 2 5 In the summer of 1945, after enduring months of harsh treatment, hundreds of
Chinese slave laborers rose up against their employers at the Kajima
mine. 126 Consequently, Japanese military and civilian police killed
over 100 Chinese laborers, and the event has since become a powerful
127
symbol of the brutality of forced labor in Japan.
Second, the contemporaneous Holocaust litigation in the United
States may have added pressure. While Part III examines this process
in greater detail, here it suffices to note that the solution devised by
the U.S. judiciary may have either put moral pressure on or offered a
plausible model for the Tokyo High Court. 128 According to one commentator, the court "took account not only of the particular circumsta.nces and problems of the [Hanaoka] Incident as such, but also of
the efforts and achievements of several foreign countries to [repair]
the damages brought by the war." 1 29 Whatever its motivations, the

court orchestrated a compromise settlement that has been followed in
130
only one other case.
In September 2004, the Osaka High Court announced it had
brokered a settlement between defendant Japan Metallurgy Company
(Nippon Yakin K6gy6) and six former slave laborers in its nickel factory. 13 1 A year before, the Kyoto District Court held that the plaintiffs'
132
claims were time-barred by the twenty-year statute of limitations.
On appeal, however, the company and former laborers struck an
124

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, JAPAN: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES-2000

(2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/dri/rls/hrrpt/20O0/eap/709.htm.

125

See Uchida, supra note 120.

126

See id.

See NICHIBENKAI, supra note 17, at 75.
128
See infra Part III.A.
129 Uchida, supra note 120. The court also tried "to think in a robust way, instead of
being constrained by conventional ways of compromise, in an effort to find solutions to
each and every pending problem concerning the Hanaoka Incident." Id.
130
Courts have unsuccessfully attempted settlements in other slave-labor cases. In July
2003, the Hiroshima High Court negotiated a settlement, which the defendant corporation later rejected. A year later, that court found for the plaintiffs, ordering the defendant
to pay each plaintiff 5.5 million yen, around $53,000. See Chinese Wartime Laborers Win in
Landmark High Court Ruling, ASAHI SHIMBUN, July 10, 2004, available at http://
www.asahi.com/english/nation/TKY200407100152.html.
131
See Chinese Wartime Slave Laborers Win Payout: Nippon Yakin Kogyo Coughs Up V 21
Million for 14-Hour Work Days in Nickel Factory,JAPAN TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at 2.
127

132

Id.
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agreement whereby each plaintiff would receive about $31,500,
roughly $164,000 less than they originally sought. t 33 While somewhat

lower than other awards, 13 4 the sum nevertheless satisfied the plaintiffs, who sacrificed a possibly larger award for the certainty of
payment.
2.

Findingsfor Plaintiffs

The slave-labor issue has polarized Japanese district courtsthree have held in favor of and three against slave-labor plaintiffs. Litigants have appealed three of these decisions, and the subsequent high
court decisions manifest a similar split-two overturned lower court
decisions for the plaintiff, while another reversed a decision for the
defendant. 135 One clear pattern surfaces from all this uncertainty:
1 36
The outcomes of slave-labor cases are unpredictable at any level.
The three district-court decisions discussed below show a broadening
web of liability, first attaching to the state, then to the corporation
involved, and finally to both.
a.

Liu Lianren

The first lower-court victory for a former Chinese slave laborer
returns us to the story of Liu Lianren. After the war, Liu's former
"employer" (the Meiji Mining Company) had dissolved, leaving him
only one extant defendant: the state.' 3 7 Liu's legal team therefore
focused on state action and charged the Japanese government with
abducting and enslaving Liu, and ultimately neglecting its duty to ensure Liu's safety. 13 8 The court agreed on only the last point, finding
133

See id.

By way of comparison, the family of Liu Lianren received a $200,000 award from
the Tokyo District Court, while laborers who sued in the Niigata District Court received
approximately $78,000 each; both of these cases have been appealed, however, so no remuneration has changed hands. See Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Co. & Japan, 50 SHOMU GEPPO
3444, 3445 (Niigata D. Ct., Mar. 26, 2004); Liu Lianren v.Japan, 1067 HANREI TAIMUZU 119
(Tokyo D. Ct., July 12, 2001).
135
In May 2004, the Fukuoka High Court overturned a district court's award on statute-of-limitations grounds. Cai Shujing v. Mitsui Mining Co., 1098 HANREI TAIMUZu 267
(Fukuoka D. Ct., Apr. 26, 2002), rev'd, 1875 HANREI JIHO 62 (Fukuoka High Ct., May 24,
2004). Six weeks later, the Hiroshima High Court awarded 27.5 million yen ($250,000) to
five former laborers, reversing an earlier district court decision. See Shao Yicheng v. Nishimatsu Constr., 1110 HANREi TAIMUZU 253 (Hiroshima D. Ct., July 9, 2002), rev'd, 1865
HANREIJIHO 62 (Hiroshima High Ct.,July 9, 2004). Finally, the Tokyo High Court reversed
the seminal decision that awarded the heirs of Liu Lianren twenty million yen for his "lost
decade." See Masami, supra note 1.
136
A chart outlining the Chinese forced labor decisions up until March 27, 2004 is
available online at http://www.sengo-sekinin.com/home/contents/issuechina/
saiban.html.
137
Takahashi YQ, Ryft Renjin Hanketsu no Seika to Eiky6 [The Outcome and Influence of the
Liu Lianren Case], 362 Ho TO MINSHU SHUGI 47, 48 (2001).
138
See id.
134
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that the government had failed to "secure the life and wellbeing" of
Liu after he fled the mine. 139 Because the state failed to locate Liu for
over twelve years, well after Japan passed its expansive 1947 National
inCompensation Law, 140 the court concluded that the government
141
curred liability by not promptly finding and repatriating him.
Although Liu's victory attached liability to the state, the Tokyo
High Court reversed the lower court's decision in June 2005.142 The
Tokyo High Court acknowledged that the government had a duty to
search for and protect Liu, but it ultimately held that the currentJapanese government could not be responsible for actions occurring
before World War

11.143

Moreover, "at the time Mr. Liu fled, there was

no 'mutual guarantee' permitting the citizens of China to sue Japan
statute of
for compensation, or vice versa."' 44 Finally, the twenty-year
145
Code.
Civil
the
of
violations
on
run
had
limitations
b.

Mitsui Mining Co.

Although subsequently overturned, the Fukuoka District Court's
2002 decision to compensate fifteen Chinese laborers contributed importantly, if obliquely, to the slave-labor litigation. 1 46 Perhaps foreshadowing its verdict, the lower court chronicled the various processes
of slave labor in excruciating detail, taking up over half of the opinion
to do so. 1 47 Moreover, the court unambiguously deemed forced labor
and mobilization 'joint unlawful acts" commissioned by Mitsui and
the state. 148 However, only Mitsui incurred liability for the acts and
had to pay each plaintiff over $100,000 in damages. 1 49 The court, invoking the principle of state immunity, exculpated the current gov139

See Liu Lianren, 1067 HANREI TAIMUZU at 119.

SeeJohn 0. Haley, JapaneseAdministrative Law, 19 LAW IN JAPAN 1, 4-5 (1986). This
law, passed during the Allied Occupation, significantly broadened state liability to cover
acts, as well as omissions, exercised by any public authority. See id. at 6. It also overturned
the concept of state immunity, which the government had enjoyed up until the time. See
id.
See Liu Lianren, 1067 HANREI TAIMUZU at 119.
141
See Japanese Court Rejects Compensation for Chinese Forced Laborer,PEOPLE'S DAILY ON142
4
LINE, June 24, 2005, http://engish.people.com.cn/200506/24/eng2005062 _192005.
html.
143
See Masami, supra note 1.
144
Gyakuten Baiso no Ryu Renjin San Izoku ga Jdkoku: Kyo sei Renko Sosh6 [Mr. Liu
Lianren's Heirs Face Reversal, Appeal: Forced LaborLitigation], ASAHI SHIMBUN, June 27, 2005,
http://www.asahi.com/national/update/0627/TKY20056270259.hrtml.
145
See Masami, supra note 1. A good synopsis of the case in Japanese is available at
http://www.suopei.org/saiban/renko/ryu/hanketsu.html.
See Cai Shujing v. Mitsui Mining Co., 1098 HANREI TAIMUZU 267 (Fukuoka D. Ct.,
146
Apr. 26, 2002), revd, 1875 HANREI JIHO 62 (Fukuoka High Ct., May 24, 2004).
147
See id. Twenty-six of its fifty pages were devoted to the factual background.
Id. at 296.
148
Id. at 301.
149
140
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ernment for the actions of its wartime predecessor. 150 Thus, while the
decision advanced slave laborers' rights to recovery in one respectby finding a corporation liable-it simultaneously hindered their
cause by shielding the state. The Fukuoka High Court overturned the
decision two years later, holding the claims against Mitsui barred by
the statute of limitations.1 5 1 In the meantime, other slave laborer litigants had at least one case to which to point for the proposition that a
corporation could be held liable for its wartime conduct.
c. Japan and Rinko Corp.
In March 2004, former slave laborers won their most complete
victory. A district court in Niigata held both Japan and the defendant
152
Rinko Corporation liable for their roles in the slave-labor system.
Rather than finding the defendants liable for any of their numerous
unlawful acts, the court attached liability somewhat circuitously. The
district court held that by abducting, transporting, and commissioning
out the slave laborers, the state created a "special social relationship"' 53 with the slave laborers, thereby incurring and violating a
"duty to ensure [their] safety." 154 The state's subsequent lack of supervision or corrective measures once it placed the laborers with
Rinko made the state liable for the abuses the laborers experienced
there. 155 The court made a similar move with Rinko, which incurred
liability by violating "legal relations resembling that of an employment
156
contract" with the slave laborers.
But this indirection did not disappoint Japanese scholars and lawyers, who hailed the decision as "epochal."1 57 One scholar noted that
"the decision placed weight on the fact that the state's participation
was notjust direct, but substantial." 58 The decision thus builds on the
Liu Lianren and Mitsui cases, and yokes them: Japan and Rinko Corporation were both liable for their respective roles in harming plaintiffs.

150
151

152

See infra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
See Mitsui, 1875 HANREI JIH6 20.
Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Co. &Japan, 50 SH6MU GEPPO 3444 (Niigata D. Ct., Mar.

26, 2004).
153

Id. at 3526.

154

Id. All employers owe their employees a "duty to provide a safe workplace" (anzen

hairyo no gimu). See HAVASHI OKI, HORITSU YOGOJITEN [DIcrIONARY OF LEGAL TERMINOLOGY]

11 (3d ed. 1994).
155

See Rinko, 50 SH6MU GEPPO at 3527.

156
157

See Okochi, supra note 43, at 23.
The term "epochal" (kakusei) has appeared repeatedly in the media. See, e.g., id. at

23; Minami, supra note 33, at 46.
158
See Ok6chi, supra note 43, at 23.
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Nevertheless, as with all plaintiff victories so far, the state and the
corporation have appealed the ruling.1 59 How the appellate court,
here the Tokyo High Court, will decide remains a mystery. If the 2005
reversal of the Liu Lianren case is any indication, however, the pros160
pects that the Rinko decision will be upheld appear dim.
3.

Findingsfor Defendants

Several courts have not ordered defendants-corporate or
state-to compensate the slave laborers. Instead, these courts have
struck a compromise: They acknowledge the illegality of forced labor,
but still immunize the corporation and state through a number of
defenses.' 61 The two most successful defenses include the statute of
1 62
limitations and state immunity.
Statute-of-limitations defenses originate from the civil code: "The
right to claim compensation for the damage which has arisen from an
unlawful act shall lapse... if twenty years have elapsed from the time
the unlawful act was committed." 6 3 Since the allegedly unlawful acts
occurred in the 1940s, this defense has been fatal to numerous plaintiffs' claims. 16 4 Though some judges, following a precedent set in the
Liu Lianren case, 16 5 have circumvented the time restriction by finding
that it "flagrantly violates principles of fairness and justice,"1 66 others
1 67
have applied it to shield various corporations.
The Japanese government also has another defense on which it
frequently relies, which is translated here as "state immunity." 168 A
159 See Slave-Laborers Win Landmark Redress in Landmark Court Ruling, JAPAN TIMES, Apr.
3, 2004, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle-p15?nn20040327al.
htm.
160
See supra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
161 See "Toki no Keika" Genkaku Tekiy6: Kokka Mutdseki wa Mitomezu ["Passage of Time"
Strictly Construed: State Immunity Not Acknowledged], NIHON KIZAI SHIMBUN YuJ KAN, May 24,

2004, at 15 (noting that six of eight decisions found the state liable for unlawful acts,
though it was exonerated by time restrictions in each).
162
163

See id.
MINPO, art. 724.

164 The following cases have invoked the statute of limitations in dismissing claims:
Zhao Zongren v. Mitsubishi Material Co., 50 SHOMU GEPPO 3369 (Sapporo D. Ct., Mar. 23,
2004); 42 Chinese Plaintiffs v. Japan & Hazama Co., 50 SHOMU GEP'PO 439 (Tokyo D. Ct.,
Mar. 11, 2003); Cai Shujing v. Mitsui Mining Co., 1098 HANREI TAIMUZU 267 (Fukuoka D.
Ct., Apr.26, 2002), rev'd, 1875 HANREI pHo 62 (Fukuoka High Ct., May 24, 2004).
165

See Liu Lianren v. Japan, 1067 HANREI TAIMUZU 119 (Tokyo D. Ct., July 12, 2001)

(holding the state liable for damages).
166

See, e.g.,
Mitsui, 1098 HANREI TAIMUZU at 300. The Supreme Court of Japan first

used the phrase to strike down a statute-of-limitations defense used by the state in 1998.
Furukawa Hiroshi v. Health Center, 52 MINSHO 1087 (Sup. Ct., July 12, 1998).
167
See supra note 164.
168 The principle of state immunity (kokka mutoseki no hori) derives from Article 3 of the
Meiji Constitution, "The Emperor is sacred and inviolable." MEIJI KENPO, art. 3. The Meiji
Constitution, in effect during World War II, inoculated a variety of official acts, such as
those performed by the police, judiciary, and military. A citizen injured in the exercise of
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corollary of the Meiji Constitution, the state-immunity principle allowed the state not to compensate people for damages caused by an
official act. 169 The principle had wide currency in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries, but scholars have noted its gradual decline over
the course of the twentieth century.1 70 Despite this trend, Japanese
courts have continued to recognize the state-immunity defense in
slave-labor cases.1 7 1 In fact, only in the past year have courts refused
to apply the principle, 72 perhaps signaling a change in judicial attitudes toward state liability.
The defenses of state immunity and statute of limitations have
shielded the government and various corporations from liability in
numerous cases. While not infallible, these defenses remain persistent hurdles that former forced laborers must confront with each lawsuit. Both defenses have almost talismanic properties; when a court
intends to shield the defendant, these mantels provide adequate justification for the court's decision. But like all forms of magic, these
defenses can be undone by other incantations, such as the familiar
refrain from the Liu Lianren case: to find for defendant would "flagrantly violate the principles of fairness and justice."'173 Rather than
leave a decision to the whims of spells, a more systematic approach is
needed. The next Part highlights two alternatives.

an official action or policy, for example, could not sue the state for damages. See Akiyama
Yoshiaki, Gyoseihd kara Mita Sengo Baish6 [Postwar Compensation:Perspectivesfrom Administrative Law], in KYODO KENKYU: CHOGOKU SENGO BAISHO, supra note 97, at 59. This protection

was eliminated by Article 17 of the current Japanese constitution, which provides, "Every
person may sue for redress as provided by law from the State or a public entity, in case he
has suffered damage through illegal act of any public official." KENPO, art. 17.
169 See Akiyama, supra note 168, at 59.
170

Id. at 52.

171
The Fukuoka District Court's 2002 decision, for example, ordered the Mitsui Mining Company to pay each plaintiff eleven million yen, but dismissed the claim against the
Japanese government. See Mitsui, 1098 HANREI TAIMUZU at 301.

172 The epochal Niigata District Court case of 2004 said the application of state immunity would "violate the principles of fairness and justice." Zhang Wenbin v. Rinko Co. &
Japan, 50 SHOM GEPPO 3444, 3585 (Niigata D. Ct., Mar. 26, 2004). Likewise, the Fukuoka
High Court case held that "there is no provision in positive law for denying state responsibility in the exercise of sovereignty." Genkoku Ga Cyakuten Haiso: Fukuoka K6sai Hanketsu:
Kuni, Kigyo No Sekinin Jik6' [Plaintiffs Lose on Appeal: Fukuoka High Court Holds Responsibility
of Government and CorporationIs Time-Barred], NIHON KEIZAi SHIMBUN, May 24, 2004, at 1.
Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Fukuoka High Court resuscitated the statute-of-limitations defense to exculpate both the State and Mitsui Mining. See Cai Shujug v. Mitsui
Mining Co., 1875 HANREI JIHO 62 (Fukuaka High Ct., May 24, 2004).
173

See Liu Lianren v. Japan, 1067 HANREI TAIMUZU 119, 149 (Tokyo D. Ct., July 12,

2001) (holding Japan liable for damages).
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III
COMPENSATING SLAVE LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES

A.

The Judicial Response

In the past decade, U.S. courts have heard a number of cases
stemming from slave labor during World War II. While the impact
American lawsuits have had on the Japanese litigation is open to debate, the American experience can serve as a useful model for resolving the issue of slave-labor compensation in Japan. Beginning in
October 1996, Holocaust-era slave laborers filed numerous class action lawsuits against Swiss banks. 17 4 Among other claims, the plaintiffs
argued that by trading assets derived from slave labor, Swiss banks
abetted the Nazi regime "in furtherance of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, crimes against peace, slave labor and genocide. '' 175 Thus,
even though the banks did not directly employ slave labor, plaintiffs
charged that the banks could be held liable simply by virtue of their
76
knowledge that these assets were tainted.'
A number of contemporaneous political events significantly
strengthened the plaintiffs' position. The support of high-ranking officials and politicians, such as Senator Alfonse d'Amato and Under
Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstatt, helped raise the profile of the
slave-labor lawsuits. 177 Threats by local and state politicians to boycott
Swiss banks likewise lent urgency to the slave laborers' case. 178 In
June 1998, the banks initially offered to settle the claims for $600 million, 179 but under the judge's guidance, the parties ultimately agreed
to over twice that sum just two months later.'8 0 By the terms of the
settlement agreements, the banks were protected from future lawsuits
in American courts.' 8 ' This settlement revealed to many spectators
the efficacy of political pressure coupled with the threat of
82
sanctions.1
174 See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 141-42 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(describing the procedural history of the lawsuits).
175
176

Id. at 141.
See id.

177

See Michael J. Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective,

20 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 11, 15 (2002).
178
See id. at 15.
179
Id.
180
See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 142. ("Defendants . . .

agreed to pay $1.25 billion, in four installments, over the course of three years."); see also
Bazyler, supra note 177, at 15 ("Under Judge Korman's guidance [the parties] settled the
case for $1.25 billion.").
181 See In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d at 142-43 ("[S]ettling plaintiffs and settlement class members have agreed irrevocably and unconditionally to release,
acquit and forever discharge certain releasees from any and all claims relating to the Holocaust, ... or any related cause or thing whatever.").
182

SeeJohn Authers & Richard Wolfe, Comment & Analysis: When Sanctions Work, FIN.

TIMES (U.K.), Sept. 9, 1998, at 22 ("The clearest lesson from the Swiss banks' $1.25-bn
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In the wake of the Swiss-bank litigation, slave-labor suits against
German companies flooded American courts.' 8 3 Before these cases
could be decided, however, German government and industry representatives stepped in, eager to avoid the disrepute suffered by the
Swiss.'

84

They established a compensatory fund in February 1999,

with the clear intent of curbing lawsuits against German companies in
the United States. 18 5 The litigation against German industry proceeded, however, resulting in a settlement in December 1999 in the
86
amount of ten billion deutschemarks, approximately $4.8 billion.'
The German government and private sector each contributed $2.4 billion to the fund, which then granted 1.25 million former laborers
awards ranging from $2,500 to $7,500.187 As with the Swiss banks, the
German state and corporations obtained "legal peace," or complete
protection from future litigation in the United States. t 88 Austria, seeing the writing on the wall, likewise set up a $410 million fund for its
1
former slave laborers.

89

It is unlikely that a similar series of political events would unfold
in Japan. America's relatively litigation-friendly legal culture and high
concentration of Holocaust survivors made it a particularly advantageous place for the former slave laborers to sue. Before turning to
whether a similar strategy might work for Chinese litigants in Japanese
courts, however, one other U.S. approach to reparation requires
consideration.
B.

California's Legislative Solution

In 1999, the California legislature proposed a statutory solution
to the reparations problem. Controversial from its inception, 190 the
statute allowed "[a]ny Second World War slave labor victim, or
heir ...

[to] bring an action to recover compensation for labor per-

settlement with holocaust survivors is this: threatening to impose sanctions can work. Every
important breakthrough in the negotiations came soon after threats from US local government officials to impose sanctions ....
).
183 Michael J. Bazyler, Nuremberg in America: Litigating the Holocaust in United States
Courts, 34 U. RJCH. L. REv. 1, 194 (2000).
184
David E. Sanger, Germans Establishing Huge Fund for Victims of Holocaust, SEAT-rLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 10, 1999, at A2.
185
See Bazyler, supra note 183, at 196.
186 See Bazyler, supra note 177, at 23-24.
187 Id. Slave laborers, or workers in concentration camps, were awarded $7,500 each;
forced laborers, or people abducted from eastern Europe and forced to work in German
factories, received $2,500 each. See id. at 24.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 25.
190 See Teresa Watanabe, Measure UrgesJapan to Apologize for Atrocities, L.A. TIMEs, Aug.
24, 1999, at A3 (noting opposing viewpoints of Assemblymembers Mike Honda and
George Nakano, the legislature's only Asian Americans).
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formed as a [slave or forced labor victim]." 1 91 It also extended the
period in which one may file suit to December 31, 2010,192 addressing
concerns about the expiration of the statute of limitations. During
the following year, plaintiffs-among them former U.S. POWs, Korean comfort women, and Chinese slave laborers-filed over thirty
lawsuits under this statute. 193 Defendants included Japanese corporations such as Mitsubishi Materials, Mitsui Mining, and Nippon
Steel.194

In a suit consolidating seven claims brought by Chinese and Korean plaintiffs, however, the Northern District of California struck
down the statute. 195 While the court agreed with the plaintiffs' basic
contention that "forced labor violates the law of nations," 196 it held
that the state statute unconstitutionally infringed on the federal government's exclusive foreign affairs power. 19 7 The court also determined that the claims, without the aid of California law, would have
been time-barred.' 98
While the United States has been inconsistent in its treatment of
slave-labor claims,' 99 its approaches to such claims are worthy of consideration. First, the courts responded. Class action lawsuits against
foreign companies attracted international attention and the participation of federal, state, and local government entities; 200 adding judicial
pressure to this political pressure, U.S. courts succeeded in facilitating
multibillion dollar settlements against foreign companies and
20
governments. '
101
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 354.6(b) (West Supp. 2006).
192 See id. § 354.6(c).
193 John Haberstroh, Note, In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation
and Obstacles to International Human Rights Claims in U.S. Courts, 10 AstAN L.J. 253, 260
(2003).
194 See In reWorld War I EraJapanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D.
Cal. 2001); In re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d. 939 (N.D.
Cal. 2000).
195 See In re World War II EraJapaneseForced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1160. The
claims brought by American POWs were dismissed in a previous suit. See In re World War 11
EraJapanese Forced Labor Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 944-45 (holding that the signing of the
1951 Treaty of Peace with Japan waived all reparations claims brought by nationals of Allied Powers).
196 See In re World War II EraJapaneseForced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1179.
197
198

Id. at 1164.
Id. at 1180.

199
See Bazyler, supra note 177, at 28 ("The U.S. government continued to play an active role ... [in] the German slave labor negotiations, even after the courts dismissed the
slave labor cases as being precluded by the post-war German treaties. For the Japanese
slave labor claims, however, the U.S. government not only sided with the Japanese companies, but, to date, has failed to press Japan and its private industry to recognize the same
type of claims that it forced Germany and its private industry to resolve.").
200 See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
201 See supra Part III.A.
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Second, the California legislature responded. Noting the insufficiency of Japanese responses to slave-labor claims, 2 0 2 state legislators
worked to provide redress by creating a statutory cause of action.
Though the district court later struck down the California statute, a
federal statute with a similar aim could achieve the results envisioned
by the California legislature. However unlikely such a statute is to pass
in the United States now that the Holocaust litigation has subsided, a
comparable statute from the Japanese Diet would provide recourse for
those slave laborers who remain uncompensated.
IV
SOLVING JAPAN'S WAR REPARATIONS PROBLEM

Frank Upham has written that litigation in Japan can serve as a
"vehicle for making the [bureaucratic] elite aware of serious social
discontent and spurring it to take remedial action." 20 3 While it may
be an overstatement to claim that Japanese concern over slave-labor
awards has reached the level of serious social discontent, various petition drives, marches, and websites indicate that many sectors of Japanese society would prefer a more comprehensive remedy. The
ambivalent decisions rendered by Japanese courts reflect the inadequacy of having isolated judges solve the war-reparations problem.
The Japanese government should step forward with a settlement
plan.

204

The settlements devised by the U.S. government and courts, in
conjunction with various European states and corporations, offer a
feasible model. 20 5 In both Europe and Japan, corporations conspired
with the national governments to force millions of "outsiders" (Jews,
Russians, and Poles in Europe; Chinese and Koreans in Japan) to
work without compensation for years. 20 6 In the European cases, the
push to settle-however belated-afforded some measure of solace to
the victims and provided a modest amount of financial compensation. 20 7 In return, corporations that collaborated with the Nazi regime have partially restored their images and, more importantly, have
20 8
gained protection from future lawsuits.
202 See Watanabe, supra note 190 ("[T] he resolution... calls on the [Japanese] government to issue a 'clear and unambiguous apology.'").
203
FRANK UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987), quoted in COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 73, at 420.
204
Other scholars have suggested a similar approach.

See, e.g., Minami, supra note 33,

at 47.
205

206
207
208

See
See
See
See

supra Part IlI.A.
supra Parts I.A, III.
In re Holocaust Victim Assets Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 139, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
id. at 142-43.
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Given the unpredictable nature of recent Japanese litigation, 20 9
the state and the thirty-five corporations that used slave labor may find
a legislatively mandated settlement attractive. First, a settlement
would render the Japanese government and private sector immune to
the financial burden, uncertainty, and psychological costs of litigation.
Furthermore, because fewer than 4,000 Chinese former slave laborers
are still alive, the total sum of any settlement would not be overly burdensome.2 10 Scholars estimate the value of unpaid wages owed to former Chinese slave laborers to be about 777 million of today's
dollars. 211 The actual settlement would be significantly less than this,
as only one in ten is alive to receive payment. By contrast, 1.25 million
212
laborers received $4.8 billion from the German state and industry.
Second, a settlement would signal official acceptance of Japan's
role in World War II abuses. While Japanese prime ministers have
2 13
sporadically apologized for some of Japan's World War II conduct,
no official has yet addressed the government's careful orchestration of
the slave-labor campaign.2 1 4 An officially sanctioned settlement would
force the government, as well as the offending corporations, to acknowledge responsibility for their manifold abuses. Furthermore, a
settlement would require the government and private sector to participate in resolving the problem, rather than continue the tight-lipped
strategy of denial that litigation requires.
Finally, settlement would allow for a harmonized and rational approach to compensation. As noted above, European awards were
based on the type of labor the slave laborer performed. A slave laborer, who worked in a concentration camp, was entitled to $7,500; a
forced laborer, who worked in a factory, was entitled to $2,500.215
While not generous, such awards at least reflect a systematic attempt
to achieve equity in compensation. Japanese awards, by contrast, have
undoubtedly been greater, but also much more variable. In addition
to $32,000 settlements, former Chinese laborers have received awards
of $55,000, $78,000, and $195,000.216 Of course, many laborers have
received nothing at all. Mass settlement effectuates a less idiosyncratic
approach to compensation: Instead of some lucky subset of survivors
See supra Part II.
210 Minami Norio, Resolving the Wartime Forced Labor Compensation Question, JAPAN Focus, http://japanfocus.org/138.html.
211 Minami, supra note 33, at 47.
212
See Bazyler, supra note 177, at 23-24.
213 Laura Hein & Mark Selden, The Lessons of War, Global Power, and Social Change, in
209

CENSORING HISTORY: CITIZENSHIP AND MEMORY IN JAPAN, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES

3, 25 (Laura Hein & Mark Selden eds., 2000).
214
See id.
215
See Bazyler, supra note 177, at 23-24.
216 See supra Part II.B.1-2.
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all survivors would get some

CONCLUSION

The slave-labor litigation in the United States and Japan is remarkable in many ways, not the least of which is the long-delayed relief it has provided many victims of some of the twentieth century's
most egregious human-rights abuses. In 2005, the sixtieth anniversary
of the end of World War II, the lawsuits underscore both the important human-rights ideals that have developed since the war and the
current commitment to them. The varied outcomes of the Japanese
litigation reflect deep-seated divisions over whether to compensate victims of forced labor. Given this variability, a large-scale settlement,
based roughly on the Euro-American scheme developed in the late
1990s, seems an ideal solution to this lingering problem.

